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2.1  Introduction 
Utilities were not always regulated by  state commissions. Throughout  the 
nineteenth century, Massachusetts was the only state that regulated public utili- 
ties (excluding railroads), and even in this one instance the state had only lim- 
ited regulatory  powers  (see Stotz and Jamison  1938, 446-49).  At the same 
time,  state constitutions often put strict limits on the regulatory authority of 
municipalities. In Connecticut, Kansas, and Kentucky, for example, the courts 
ruled that local governments could not restrict entry by offering utilities perpet- 
ual and exclusive franchises; similarly, in Indiana, Illinois, and Massachusetts, 
municipalities could not directly regulate the rates charged by  utilities.' It was 
not until the second decade of  the twentieth century that this situation began 
to change. In the fifteen years between  1907 and  1922, nearly  thirty  states 
created public utility commissions (see Stigler and Friedland  1962; Stotz and 
Jamison 1938,450). 
It is important to understand the forces behind this institutional shift, as such 
understanding helps identify the factors that determine the political  and eco- 
nomic viability of  unregulated markets. Moreover, since many of  the interest 
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groups involved in lobbying for state utility regulation  were also involved in 
lobbying for a variety of other regulatory changes, such as the reform of mu- 
nicipal  government  and municipal  ownership of  utilities,  understanding  the 
battle over state utility regulation helps clarify these other aspects of Progres- 
sive Era politics. Finally, the legal and technological changes experienced by 
utilities at the turn of the century paralleled structural changes in other sectors 
of  the economy. To  the extent that these shifts were related,  identifying  the 
antecedents of state utility regulation sheds light on these other changes. 
One of  three different frameworks  can be used to examine the origins of 
state utility regulation. Traditional public interest arguments maintain that state 
utility commissions were created because unrestrained competition in the pres- 
ence of  natural monopoly led to uneconomic duplication of service and brief 
periods of ruinous price competition  that were surrounded by longer periods 
of consolidation  and monopoly  power.’ A competing private interest view  is 
that state commissions were created at the behest of  producers hoping to fore- 
stall the relatively hostile regulation of municipalities (Jarrell 1978). One way 
to explain the relative effectiveness of  municipal regulation  is to argue that, 
because consumers monitored local regulators better than state regulators, mu- 
nicipal authorities faced stronger electoral incentives to bring consumers low 
rates. This argument is developed later in the paper. 
A third, and not necessarily competing, hypothesis draws on the long-term 
contracting  literature and is based on the assumption that there was (and is) 
widespread asset specificity in utility industries (see Goldberg 1976; Joskow 
199 1; Jacobson  1989; Williamson  1985, 327-64).  According to the long-term 
contracting interpretation, utilities needed to make large investments in fixed 
plant and distribution systems that were not mobile, easily adapted to alterna- 
tive purposes,  or resold.  Before  investing  heavily  in such  assets,  producers 
would have desired assurances-credible  commitments-from  consumers and 
municipal authorities that these groups would not conspire to set confiscatory 
rate schedules. Consumers, on the other hand, would have demanded similar 
commitments  from utility  companies before  investing  in fixtures  for using 
electric, gas, water, and so forth. That is, they would have needed to be confi- 
dent that  producers  were  not going to begin  charging monopolistic  rates or 
providing inconsistent service. A state regulatory commission that was respon- 
sive to both consumer groups and utilities would have been one way to protect 
these investments and to provide consumers and utilities with the necessary 
commitments (see Goldberg  1976; Williamson  1985, 327-64). 
2. The reasoning of  Stotz and Jamison is illustrative: “[Clompctitinn between gas companies is 
. . . a public nuisance. . . . It means a double burden on the streets, as two companies instead of 
one will be digging up the streets. If there are three competitors. the situation is that much worse. 
Moreover, competition between gas companies is not practicable in the long run. It leads inevitably 
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Although each of these theories likely captures elements of the story, there 
is little consensus as to which theory best explains the origins and purposes of 
state regulation. One reason  that the political  economy  of  utility  regulation 
remains unclear may be that  there have been  few detailed  studies of utility 
markets in the years prior to state regulation.? As Priest (1993, 322-23)  re- 
cently argued, how can one assess the impact of state regulation without having 
at least a limited understanding  of  the legal  and regulatory  institutions that 
preceded it? Moreover, since many utilities operated for nearly a century be- 
fore they were regulated by  state authorities (see Stotz and Jamison  1938, 4- 
lo), focusing solely on the experience of  state regulatory commissions over- 
states that institution's historical significance and, perhaps more importantly, 
leads one to ignore a potentially valuable body of data and evidence. 
Using the Chicago manufactured coal-gas industry as a case study, this pa- 
per explores the evolution of utility markets in the years prior to state regula- 
tion. This study sheds light on a number of issues. First, it identifies the legal 
and regulatory regimes that preceded state regulation and offers some prelimi- 
nary hypotheses and data on how well these regimes functioned and what led 
to their demise. It also clarifies the role technological change played in generat- 
ing shifts in regulatory policy. Finally, the history of the Chicago gas industry 
offers insight into the relationship between asset specificity and the origins of 
state reg~lation.~ 
The early history  of  the Chicago gas industry can be  separated into five 
distinct phases-an  early period of stability, a more dynamic competitive pe- 
riod, an unregulated  monopoly period, a municipal-regulated  monopoly pe- 
riod, and a state-regulated monopoly period. During the industry's  formative 
years, from 1850 through the  late  187Os, two dominant  firms  sold gas to a 
market limited by competition from alternative fuel sources. In 1878, an exog- 
enous technology shock (described in detail below) altered the structure of the 
industry, ushering in a more competitive era. Within a decade, this technologi- 
cal change had attracted  six new  gas companies  to  the  industry and driven 
down real gas prices by about 50 percent (see Troesken  1993). Producers re- 
sponded to this  increasingly competitive environment by  lobbying for legal 
changes that would  slow the rate of  entry and enable them to acquire more 
market power. Partly  in response to producers'  lobbying efforts, the Illinois 
legislature passed the Gas Acts in  1897, initiating the third phase of the Chi- 
cago gas industry's history-unregulated  monopoly. The Gas Acts (described 
3. Jacobson 1989 and Brown 1936 are two exceptions, although they both emphasize different 
issues than does the study here. Moreover, neither of these studies attempts to link their findings 
to the origins of state regulation. 
4. Although both Williamson and Zupan examine the importance of asset specificity in franchise 
bidding schemes for cable television. there are  few efforts to identify the relationship between  " 
asset specificity and the origins of state utility regulation. See Williamson 1985, 352-65;  Zupan 
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in detail below) restricted  entry and removed various common law obstacles 
to merger and consolidation. 
Following  the  passage of  the  Gas Acts, producers  acquired  substantially 
more market power, ultimately merging into a single firm.  This increased mar- 
ket  power,  and  the  higher  prices  implied  by  such  power,  caused  agitation 
among Chicago politicians and gas consumers. In response to this dissatisfac- 
tion, the State of Illinois passed the Enabling Act of  1905, granting the Chi- 
cago City Council regulatory power over gas rates in the city. Prior to the pas- 
sage of the Enabling Act, Chicago gas companies were subject to no direct 
rate regulation by either state or municipal authorities, though the city did pos- 
sess some limited powers over taxation and market entry. The industry’s final 
phase-state-regulated  monopoly-came  in  19  13 with the creation of the Illi- 
nois  Public  Utilities  Commission. Qualitative  and quantitative evidence  are 
consistent with the hypothesis that producers lobbied for state regulation in an 
effort to forestall the relatively hostile regulation of municipal authorities. 
2.2  The Nineteenth Century: An Era of Unregulated Competition 
2.2.1  Market Structure and Performance, 1850-1897 
From the mid-nineteenth  century until  1880, manufactured coal gas was a 
luxury commodity with a relatively  small market. During the early  1870s, it 
would have cost more than  15 percent of the average laborer’s income to light 
a Chicago home with gas;5 virtually all manufactured gas sold during this pe- 
riod was used  for lighting  (see Department of  the Interior  1895, 706). Gas 
companies  thus  sold  primarily  to businesses  and  the  wealthy.  Mains  were 
rarely laid in working-class neighborhoods (Platt 199  1, 14). Furthermore, dur- 
ing this period manufactured  coal gas faced competition from other lighting 
sources. An industry  survey published by  the U.S. Census Office explained 
that in  1870 “gas . . . was still much higher in price per unit of light than oil 
lamps, and for this reason could not compete with kerosene” (Department of 
the Interior 1902, 713). Because the market for coal gas was so limited during 
this period, only two companies, the Chicago Gas Light and Coke Company 
and the Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company, operated in the city until the 
early 1870s. In  1 87  I, the Hyde Park Gas Company, a small suburban concern, 
was organized.6 
5. It required about two thousand cubic feet of gas to light the typical household for a month. 
During the early 1870s, gas (in Chicago) sold for $3.50 per one thousand cubic feet. The average 
US. laborer earned roughly $480 per year in  1870. These estimates are based on the following 
sources: Chicago Tribune, 8 June  1888, 8; Peoples  Gas Light and Coke Company  1900; US. 
Bureau of the Census 1975, 165; Lebergott 1976, 346-47. 
6. In the summer of  1862, these two companies entered into a restrictive covenant, a contract 
dividing the city into two exclusive markets. Under the covenant, Chicago Gas controlled the north 
and south divisions of the city, while Peoples Gas restricted its operations to Chicago’s west side. 59  The Institutional Antecedents of  State Utility Regulation 
The commercial introduction of water-gas technology altered this structure. 
Prior to the introduction of water gas, ordinary coal gas was the only type of 
manufactured gas sold, and it had been produced commercially since the early 
1800s.  Water gas, in contrast, was not used on a wide scale until the late 1870s 
and early 1880s. As already noted, both were used almost solely as a fuel for 
lighting. Coal gas was manufactured by filling fireclay boxes, called retorts, 
with several tons of coal. Gas was then distilled by heating the coal to a temper- 
ature of  1,000”  to 2,500” Fahrenheit for five to sixty  hours.  Water gas was 
manufactured by  passing steam and a vaporized oil through the incandescent 
beds of coal. This process enhanced the lighting power of the gas.’ 
The most important difference between coal and water gas technology was 
that the latter required  a smaller investment  in fixed plant and capital.* The 
United  Gas Improvement  Company explained:  “For equivalent capacity,  [a] 
water gas apparatus costs much less to install, and occupies much less ground 
space than  coal gas equipment. Moreover, the space required  for storage of 
fuel for a water gas plant is only about one-third of that required for coal gas” 
(1911, 15). 
By reducing the fixed costs of production, water gas lowered the costs of 
entry and moved the industry toward a more competitive structure. Between 
I88  1 and  1885, six new gas companies were organized-the  Lake Gas Com- 
pany, the Consumers’ Gas Fuel and Light Company, the Suburban Gas Com- 
pany, the Equitable Gas Light and Fuel Company, the Calumet Gas Company, 
and the Illinois Light, Heat, and Power Company. This entry spawned fierce 
competition. Price wars drove Consumers’ Gas into receivership by the mid- 
1880s, while the Chicago Gas Light and Coke Company and Equitable Gas 
both had difficulty meeting their debt obligations during this period. The mar- 
ket value of  the former fell by  about a third.’  The combination of entry and 
cost-reducing technological change drove down real gas prices in the city by 
The agreement was stable for nearly two decades; neither firm attempted to enter the other’s terr- 
tory until the mid-1880s. Although this situation does not sound very competitive, it appears that 
the threat of entry limited the market power of these two firms. More precisely, entry costs proba- 
bly were not prohibitive, as the Chicago Gas Light and Coke Company began laying mains in the 
west side territory of Peoples Gas in the summer of  1886.  As already noted, there was competition 
from other lighting sources. The early history of the Chicago gas industry can be found in the 
following sources: Illinois Bureau of Labor Statistics 1897, 276-79;  Chicago City Council  1914, 
19-20; Rice 1925, 1-33;  Smith 1926, 10-20. 
7. For accessible and detailed descriptions of the production of coal and water gas, see Rice 
1925,34-35, and Chicago City Council 1914,21-30. 
8. Other differences  were that the production of  water gas appears to have  been  less labor- 
intensive. Water gas also had greater illuminating power than coal gas. For example. in 1894, the 
average candlepower of coal gas was approximately 18.3. The candlepower of water gas averaged 
25.3. This estimate is based on a survey of nearly eight hundred firms taken from the 1894 volume 
of Browns Dicrionary of  American Gas Companies. See also Shelton 1889, 194; American Gas, 
Fuel, and Light Company 1881. 
9. Calculation based on stock-price quotations taken from the Chicago Tribune. For a general 
discussion of the financial difficulties of these firms, see also Commercial and Financial Chroni- 
cle, 15 December 1888, 746. 60  Werner Troesken 
about 50 percent (Troesken 1993). Gas markets in Baltimore and New York 
also experienced rapid market entry and price competition following the com- 
mercial introduction of water gas (see Stotz and Jamison  1938, 249; Brown 
1936; American Gas Light Journal 2 August 1879,49; 16 October 1879, 169; 
3 November 1884,236). 
Producers attempted to suppress this competition through the organization 
of a holding company known as the Chicago Gas Trust Company. (The holding 
company may have also enabled producers to exploit scale economies.) Orga- 
nized in the spring of  1887, the Gas Trust dominated the industry for only a 
short time. In  1887 and  1888, the Gas Trust's only competitor was a small 
Hyde Park concern, but throughout the late 1880s and 1890s, additional entry 
reduced the market power of the Gas Trust. In 1889 and 1890, two firms-the 
Mutual Fuel Gas Company and the Chicago Economic Fuel Gas Company- 
entered the industry.'" In  the summer of  1894, the Universal Gas Company 
was incorporated. An ordinance passed by  the Chicago City Council gave the 
company  the  right  to  operate  anywhere  in  the  city. The  Chicago Tribune 
claimed that the Universal's plant, the largest gas manufacturing plant in the 
world at the time of  its construction, had the capacity to supply Chicago with 
two-thirds of  its total demand for coal gas (see Chicago City Council  1914, 
22; Chicago Tribune 17 July 1894, 1  ; 18 July 1894, 1-2;  19 July 1894, 1, 7; 5 
October  1895, 4; 6 February  1895, 4; 20 May  1897, 7). The organization of 
the Ogden Gas Company in 1895 further eroded the trust's market share. The 
Ogden Gas Company was manufacturing and selling gas on the city's north 
side by  the fall of  1897 (see Illinois  Bureau of  Labor Statistics 1897, 306; 
Chicago City Council 1914,22).  Three other companies contemplated entering 
but never carried out these plans." 
Table 2.1 compares the Chicago gas industry's market structure and nominal 
price performance during this period of unregulated competition to its struc- 
ture and performance under three other regulatory regimes-unregulated  mo- 
nopoly (referring to the period after passage of the Gas Acts and before pas- 
sage of the Enabling Act), municipal-regulated monopoly, and state-regulated 
monopoly. Note that from 1878 through 1897, market entry was relatively fre- 
quent; a new company entered the industry once every two years. In contrast, 
after the passage of the Gas Acts in 1897, entry ceased and the market became 
increasingly consolidated. Moreover, entry did not increase under either state 
regulation or municipal regulation. These data on market structure, as well as 
10. In the early spring of  1892, though, the owners of  the Chicago Gas Company acquired 
control over the Chicago Economic Fuel Gas Company by purchasing a majority of its outstanding 
stock. See Chicago Tribune, 22 February 1892, I; 19 February 1892, 12; 20 February  1892, 1-2; 
28 February 1892,2. 
I  I. In  the summer of  1893, the Continental Gas Company of  Chicago was incorporated. One 
year later, producers planned to organize the Plant Gas Company. In the fall of  1894, the Citizens 
Co-operative Gas Company was incorporated. The company intended that its stock would be "dis- 
tributed in small amounts among consumers, instead of  being owned by  a few capitalists." See 
American Gas LightJournul, 5 June 1893, 1.57; 27 August 1894, 301; 12 March 189.5, 336. 61  The Institutional Antecedents of  State Utility Regulation 
Table 2.1  Legal Environment, Market Structure, and Nominal Prices, 
1878-1924 
Number of Competing 
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Table 2.1  (continued) 
Sources: For market structure and legal environment  descriptions, see text. Price data were col- 
lected from various issues of Browns Direcrop ofAmerican Gus Companies. 
= no direct rate regulation, though municipal authorities had limited powers over taxation and 
entry; M = municipal rate regulation; S = state rate regulation. 
“The Ogden Gas Company was organized in 1895 but did not begin operations until  1897. Also, 
in  1900, Peoples Gas and Ogden Gas entered into a restrictive  covenant  dividing the city  into 
separate market shares, but they were still under separate managerial control. 
‘Prices expressed  in (current) dollars per one thousand cubic feet. Prices in parentheses indicate 
what prices would have been if the 1900 and  191  1 rate ordinances had been enforced. 
the behavior of  real gas prices, which as noted  above fell by  50 percent, are 
consistent with the hypothesis that market forces were operative during this 
period.12 
2.2.2  The Illinois Constitution and Municipal Regulation before 1905 
Before 1905, Chicago gas producers operated free of any direct rate regula- 
tion. Throughout the nineteenth century, the courts made it clear that, without 
a special grant from the  state legislature, the  city  council did  not  have the 
power to unilaterally  dictate gas rates in  Chicago. For instance, in  1900, the 
city passed a coercive ordinance requiring Chicago gas companies to reduce 
their rates from $1.00 per one thousand cubic feet to $0.75. The Peoples Gas 
Light  and Coke Company refused to comply, filing  suit  in federal court  to 
secure injunctive relief. On appeal, the US.  Supreme Court denied the injunc- 
tion on the grounds that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction in the matter (see 
Peoples  Gas Light  and  Coke Company  v.  City of  Chicago, 48 L. Ed.  851 
[  19031). However, a stockholder of the gas company and, importantly, a resi- 
dent of California, Darius 0. Mills, sued in federal court with the identical 
objective. Since Mills resided in another state, the federal courts could claim 
jurisdiction. 
In Mills v. City of Chicago, the court granted Chicago gas companies injunc- 
tive relief, ruling that “the regulation of the prices to charge consumers by gas 
companies is not one of the powers essential to municipal government, and is 
not included in general powers conferred on cities” (1 27 Fed. 73  1 [ 1904],73  1). 
The court explained that, unless the state constitution, or the legislature, explic- 
itly granted regulatory powers to city governments, such powers could only be 
exercised by the state: “and such power cannot be exercised by a city unless it 
has been delegated by the state in express words, or by fair implication from a 
power expressly  granted”  (731). The City of  Chicago  appealed  to the U.S. 
12. This does not mean that producers earned zero profits. Indeed, since asset specificity made 
market exit, and therefore entry, costly, incumbent firms probably  earned borne excess profits. It 
only suggests that market entry, and  the threat of  entry, were real and viable constraints on the 
behavior of Chicago gas producers and kept gas prices in Chicago lower than they otherwise would 
have been. The presence of competition, in turn, protected consumers against producers’ attempts 
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Supreme Court, claiming that Mills and Peoples Gas colluded in bringing the 
suit, but the lower court’s ruling was upheld (see City of  Chicago LI. Darius 0. 
Mills, 5 1 L. Ed. 504 [ 19071). Without a special act of the Illinois legislature, 
the city council could not claim the authority to regulate rates. 
It should be pointed out, however, that during this period the Chicago City 
Council did have some limited control over taxation and entry. Through what 
were known as municipal contract ordinances, the city granted gas companies 
the rights needed to dig up streets and to lay and repair mains. Municipal con- 
tracts also sometimes promised  incumbent  firms exclusive operating rights, 
but, at least in the case of Chicago, it does not appear that contractual promises 
of exclusivity were always kept. For  example,  in a municipal  contract ordi- 
nance agreed to in 1891 (described below), the city promised the Chicago Gas 
Company that it would be protected against competition, yet within four years 
the city granted two other companies-the  Universal Gas Company and the 
Ogden Gas Company-franchises  to operate in the city. Nonetheless, in return 
for the rights granted through contract ordinances, producers typically agreed 
to a schedule fixing rates over the next five years. Producers also agreed to pay 
the city a percentage of their revenues over the same five-year interval.l3  It is 
important to stress that the city could not unilaterally dictate the terms of the 
contract ordinance. Gas companies had to offer their full consent before they 
became binding. (The 1900 coercive rate ordinance discussed above was not a 
contract  ordinance.  The city  unilaterally  ordered  gas companies to  charge 
$0.75. It did not bargain with them.) 
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle described a contract ordinance 
drafted in early 189  1 (20 June 189  1,939): 
The Chicago dispatches state that a settlement has definitely been reached 
with the city officials on the basis of $1 gas to the city and the city to get 3 
and 1/2 percent of the gross receipts. The price of gas to other consumers is 
to remain at $1.25 until  1893, when a reduction of 5 cents in price will be 
made each year until  $1 is reached. . . . This settlement carries with it the 
assurance that the company will be protected  by  the city against competi- 
tion. . . . The agreement for the reduction in the price of gas is to continue 
as long as the franchise of the gas company is not attacked by  the city of 
Chicago, and so long as the present rights of the said companies to extend 
mains within the city are not curtailed. 
This quote illustrates the consensual nature of municipal contract ordinances. 
It  was  important  that  the  city’s regulatory  control  under  municipal  con- 
tracting excluded direct and complete control over rates because of produces’ 
asset-specific investments. Specifically,  the unique nature of gas distribution 
meant that producers had to invest substantial resources in a system of under- 
13. It is not clear if  these payments  were used to compensate Chicago residents for the costs 
they incurred while gas companies dug up streets or if municipal politicians simply appropriated 
these payments, not returning them to residents in the form of lower taxes or increased public ser- 
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ground mains in order to distribute gas; according to one investigation  per- 
formed by the Chicago City Council, the costs of distributing gas constituted 
roughly 40 percent of the total costs incurred by local producers (Chicago City 
Council  1906, 2-3).  This system of  mains, and the legal and political rights 
needed to lay them, could not be costlessly transferred across municipal juris- 
dictions. As a result, if  the market for manufactured coal gas in Chicago col- 
lapsed, producers would have found it difficult to move their assets to another 
geographic market. Thus the legal provisions  that prevented  the city council 
from regulating rates gave Chicago gas companies, who were held hostage by 
their sizable and immobile investments, a powerful guarantee that their invest- 
ments were safe from hostile, and perhaps confiscatory, rate regulation by mu- 
nicipal a~thorities.’~  (The efficacy of municipal rate regulation is discussed in 
detail below.) 
2.3  The Gas Acts and the Origins of Monopoly 
2.3.1  A Legislative History of the Gas Acts 
The next phase in the Chicago gas industry’s evolution toward state regula- 
tion-unregulated  monopoly-began  in  1897  when  the  state  legislature 
passed the Gas Acts. The Gas Acts consisted of two laws, the Lowenthal Street 
Frontage Act and the Gas Consolidation Act. The Street Frontage Act erected 
a prohibitive  entry barrier. It provided  that before any Illinois gas company 
could lay mains along a street or alley the company had to secure permission 
from a majority of the property  owners who held land fronting that street or 
alley. The law further empowered any dissenting property owner to block con- 
struction  of  the main,  regardless  of  the  position  taken  by  other  individuals 
along the street. (The Street Frontage Act required electric companies to se- 
cure similar approval before stringing wires along a street.) After 1897, all an 
incumbent firm needed to do to prevent entry was to bribe a property owner to 
oppose construction of the mains; as explained in greater detail below, no new 
firms entered the industry after 1897. The Gas Consolidation Act removed the 
court-erected obstacles to merger and combination; before 1897, the common 
law explicitly discouraged combination among competing Chicago gas com- 
panies  (see Chicago Gas Light  Co.  v. Peoples  Gas Light  Co., 121 Ill. 520 
[1887]; People v.  Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 Ill. 268 [1.889]). 
The legislative history of  the Gas Acts reveals that the lobbying efforts of 
the Chicago Gas Trust played an important role in securing and shaping their 
passage. The Street Frontage Act  was not put into law  the  first time  it was 
14. Note that the courts’ adherence to substantive due process during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries also provided protection against confiscatory rate regulation. In the Reagan 
cases of 1894 and in Smyth v. Ames in  1898, the courts held that, “if the rates fixed by a State are 
unreasonably low, they are obnoxious to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.” See Mat- 
thews and Thompson 1901,254, and, more generally, Hovenkamp 1988. 65  The Institutional Antecedents of State Utility Regulation 
considered. The bill was initially introduced by  state senator Miller of Cook 
County-Chicago  is located in Cook County-in  early 1895.” Although the 
bill passed both houses, it was vetoed by Governor John P.  Altgeld in the sum- 
mer of  1895. In vetoing the law, Altgeld maintained:  “In no instance has the 
public asked for the passage of  this bill. The Chicago gas companies labored 
for its passage” (Chicago Tribune, 25 June 1895, 3). 
In the spring of  1897, the Illinois legislature reconsidered the Street Front- 
age Bill (Senate Bill 400) and another measure,  the Gas Consolidation Bill 
(Senate Bill 387). Again, Chicago gas companies appear to have been active 
lobbyists. One state senator even claimed that the attorney for the Chicago Gas 
Trust wrote the text of the Gas Consolidation  Bill (see Chicago Tribune, 20 
May 1897, 2,7). Also, when the legislature began considering these proposals, 
the Civic Federation of Chicago published a pamphlet protesting the passage 
of  these laws; in  its writings, the Civic Federation  claimed to represent  the 
interests of unorganized Chicago voters, consumers, and taxpayers.I6 The fed- 
eration maintained, “These  two gas bills are to be taken as one, as they are 
closely allied and are being pushed by the same forces and for the same pur- 
pose,  viz.:  to give the Gas Trust everything  it wants and to give the public 
nothing in return” (I  897, 3). The Civic Federation also organized a mass pub- 
lic rally at a large Chicago auditorium to protest passage of  the Gas Acts (see 
the Chicago Tribune, 28 May 1897, 2; 2 June 1897, 2). It was a vain attempt. 
On 1 June 1897, the Illinois legislature passed the Gas Consolidation Act and 
the Street Frontage  Act.17 Governor Tanner  signed the measures into law  a 
short time later. 
Exactly why Chicago gas companies waited until the late 1890s to secure 
passage of the Gas Acts is not clear, but the introduction of water gas may help 
explain the timing of these laws. As noted above, water gas moved the industry 
toward a more competitive structure, and this in turn may have increased the 
marginal benefit to producers of securing laws that impaired the market mecha- 
nism. Beyond this, the frequent market entry induced by  the introduction of 
water  gas  may  have  increased  electoral support for laws  restricting  entry 
15. This first bill was slightly weaker than the bill that ultimately passed. Like the later version, 
this bill prohibited any Illinois city or town from granting a franchise “for the laying of  gas pipes 
. . . without the consent of  the owners of more than one-half of the property fronting the street or 
alley along which it [was] . . .  proposed to lay the pipes” (American Gas Light Journal, 25 March 
1895, 413). Unlike the final version of the Street Frontage Act, however, it did not guarantee 
dissenting property owners the right to block construction of the mains through a court-issued in- 
junction. 
16. Pegram writes that  “a coalition of businesspeople, professionals, labor leaders and social 
workers created the Civic Federation.” He adds that, after its founding in  1893, “[b]usinesspeople 
and professionals quickly came to dominate the federation . . . turning it to the middle-class pur- 
poses of cleaning up city hall and promoting efficiency in the conduct of public business” (1992, 
91). See also Roberts 1960 for the history of the Civic Federation. 
17. The Illinois Senate passed the Street Frontage Act by a vote of 31 to 13, the Gas Consolida- 
tion Act by a vote of  29 to 17. The house passed the Street Frontage Act by a vote of 90 to 49, the 
Gas Consolidation  Act  by  a vote of  89 to 52. See Illinois  1897, 600-601;  700-701;  744-45; 
780-81;  788-89;  794-95;  822-23. 66  Werner Troesken 
among voters who did not use gas; when a new gas company entered the indus- 
try, it had to dig up the streets, imposing costs on all Chicagoans, gas consumer 
or not. Consistent with this view, probably no more than one out of every four 
Chicagoans purchased gas during the early twentieth century.I8 Finally, the in- 
creased popularity of electricity during this period likely had similar effects. 
2.3.2  The Effects of  the Gas Acts 
Several independent  pieces of evidence are consistent with the hypothesis 
that the Gas Acts created and sanctioned monopoly in the Chicago gas indus- 
try. First, as table 2.1 shows, no new firms entered the industry  after  1897, 
and at the same time existing firms began consolidating their market power.I9 
Second, stock market data indicate  that  investing  in  Chicago gas securities 
became far less risky, in part because the threat of  entry had been eliminated.’O 
Third, an event study reveals that, when Governor Altgeld vetoed the first ver- 
sion of the Street Frontage Act, the market value of the Chicago Gas Company 
fell by  over  15 percent.”  Finally, as table 2.1  shows, nominal  gas prices  in 
Chicago fell  steadily  until  1897, but  after passage  of  the Gas Acts,  prices 
stopped falling and remained constant until  1905. (In 1905, the city acquired 
the authority to regulate rates.) 
Certainly factors other than the passage of  the Gas Acts may have caused 
Chicago gas prices to stop falling. To  control for at least some of these other 
factors, gas prices in Chicago are divided by  the average price of gas in the 
following  cities: Wilmington,  Delaware; Burlington,  Iowa; Iowa City, Iowa; 
Sioux City, Iowa;  Danville,  Kentucky;  Owensboro, Kentucky;  Shelbyville, 
Kentucky;  and  Minneapolis,  Minnesota.  (Each  city  is  equally  weighted.) 
18. Unfortunately, it is difficult to acquire data for earlier periods, hut in 1910 the population of 
Chicago was 2.2 million, while in  1916 the total number of  gas consumers in the city (businesses 
and families) was less than 660,000. See Illinois General Assembly 1917, 7. 
19. The Municipal Gas Company operated for three months during 1900, hut it was owned and 
controlled by the Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company. Municipal Gas leased all of  its mains 
and purchased all of its gas from Peoples Gas. In late  August  1900, Municipal Gas initiated  a 
price  war with the  Ogden Gas Company. Gas prices on the north  side fell by  60 percent:  first 
Municipal  Gas cut the price it charged for gas from $1 .OO per one thousand cubic feet to $0.60: 
then Ogden Gas reduced its price to $0.60. Prices eventually fell to $0.40. Since this all occurred 
within  a two-month  span and was concentrated in  a small geographic region on  the city’s north 
side, it is not considered when calculating the prices presented in table 2. I. See Commercial and 
Financial  Chronicle,  8 September 1900, 506. In  November,  the Ogden Gas Company and  the 
Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company began laying the groundwork for future consolidation. A 
few days after the two companies worked out their differences, Municipal  Gas ceased operating. 
See, again, Commercial and Finaricial Chronicle. 
20. Between  1891 and  1897, the market beta associated with Chicago gas securities was  1.4; 
between 1897 and  1913, it was 0.7. The market beta measures the level of systematic risk associ- 
ated with a security. Systematic risk is the only type of risk that concerns a rational investor be- 
cause it is the only type of risk that cannot be diversified away. 
2 1. Because it is not possible to identify a precise event date for the passage of the Gas Acts 
(i.e., it is not possible to identify exactly when the market learned the law would he passed), the 
effects of the passage  of  these laws could not he identified  directly. However, because Governor 
Altgeld’s veto of  the first Street Frontage Act was unanticipated by the market, it was much easier 
to isolate its effects. The event study results are available upon request. 67  The Institutional Antecedents of  State Utility Regulation 
These other cities act as a control group. They were similar to Chicago except 
that their regulatory environments remained constant between  1878 and 1924. 
Through time, then, changes in the ratio of Chicago gas prices to the average 
price for the control group should filter out industry-wide price changes and 
help isolate the effects of the Gas Acts. (These same cities will be used below 
to compare the effects of municipal and state regulation.) 
The ratio of prices in Chicago to prices in the control group began to rise 
after  1897. In other words, prices in cities, unlike Chicago, that did not have 
laws like the Gas Acts continued to fall after 1897.?*  This is consistent with 
the hypothesis that the Gas Acts caused prices in Chicago to be higher than 
they otherwise would have been. However, this ratio should be interpreted cau- 
tiously, as there are some potential problems. First, if regulation is endogenous 
or driven by some unidentified variable that affected prices in Chicago but not 
in the control group, the behavior  of  this ratio could be misleading.?' Also, 
there may have been events in the control-group cities that did not occur in 
Chicago, and this may affect the reliability of these data. 
Shortly after passage of  the  Gas Acts, producers  began  consolidating.  In 
August 1897, the Chicago Gas Light and Coke Company, the Lake Gas Com- 
pany, the Consumers Gas Fuel and Light Company, the Equitable Gas Light 
and Fuel Company, the Suburban Gas Company, the Illinois Light, Heat, and 
Power Company, and the Chicago Economic Fuel Gas Company all merged 
under the title of  the Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company. On  10 January 
1898 Peoples Gas absorbed the Mutual Gas Company and the Hyde Park Gas 
Company. One year later, the Calumet Gas Company was acquired. In  1900, 
Peoples Gas entered into a restrictive covenant with the Ogden Gas Company, 
granting the latter exclusive control over the city's north side. Peoples Gas con- 
trolled the city's west and south sides. By 1907, Peoples Gas began leasing the 
property of  its last two rivals, the Universal  and Ogden companies, and had 
obtained a secure monopoly position over the industry. In  1913, Peoples Gas 
formally purchased both ~ompanies.?~ 
The changes in price and market structure that followed the passage of the 
Gas Acts likely increased the demand for some form of political rate regulation 
among consumers/voters. To see this, note that, as long as market forces kept 
gas prices  in  Chicago  near  competitive  levels,  regulation,  whether  munici- 
pal or state, would not have reduced rates substantially. The benefits of  such 
regulation to consumers therefore would have been limited. After the enact- 
22. Between 1878 and 1896, the ratio of Chicago gas prices to the control-group price averaged 
59 percent. Between 1897 and 1905, the ratio averaged 67 percent. Also, when this ratio is plotted 
over time, it is constant between  1887 and  1897 and begins to slope upward after 1897. All of 
these data are available upon request. 
23. Other Illinois cities, however, were also subject to the Gas Acts. They revealed the same 
trends as Chicago. These data are available upon request. 
24. The history of the Chicago gas industry between 1897 and 1913 is taken from various issues 
of the Commercial and Financial Chronicle; and Rice 1925, 37-43. 68  Werner Trnesken 
ment of the Street Frontage and Gas Consolidation Acts, though, producers’ 
market  power  increased,  and  gas  rates  probably  rose  closer to  monopoly 
levels. The incremental  benefit of  regulation  to consumers thus would have 
risen,  increasing  the  demand  among  unorganized  voters  for  a  regulatory 
change. 
2.4  Municipal Regulation: Origins and Effects 
2.4.1  Origins 
Consistent with the interpretation that the demand for rate regulation  rose 
as a result  of  the Gas Acts, after  1897 the Chicago City Council, the  state 
attorney general, and individual consumers attempted to reduce gas rates in 
the city. First, in  1900, the city council  passed the aforementioned  coercive 
rate ordinance that, if  enforced, would have reduced Chicago gas prices from 
$1.00 per one thousand cubic feet to $0.75. This was the first time in the city’s 
history that the council attempted to unilaterally dictate gas prices. Also, after 
Peoples Gas gained control of gas production in Hyde Park, the company in- 
creased gas prices there from $0.72 to $1.00. Several residents of Hyde Park 
jointly  sought an injunction  preventing  the increase. Their efforts, however, 
proved futile. An Illinois appellate court denied the injunction (Peoples Gas 
Light and Coke Co. v.  Frederick  C. Hale et al., 94 111.  App. 406 [1900]). In 
1903, the  Illinois attorney  general  initiated  a quo warranto suit against the 
Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company on behalf of  the citizens of Chicago. 
The  attorney  general  claimed  that  the  Gas Consolidation  Act  of  1897- 
Peoples Gas derived its legitimacy from this law-was  unconstitutional, first 
because the law was improperly titled, and second because it granted Peoples 
Gas privileges not available to other corporations or associations in the state. 
The courts ruled in favor of the gas company (The People ex rel. v. Peoples’ 
Gas Lighr and Coke Co., 205 111.  482 [ 19031). 
The regulatory  power of  the Chicago City  Council rose when the Illinois 
legislature passed the Enabling Act of  1905. This law explicitly empowered 
the city council to regulate gas (and electric) rates in the city and authorized 
the  city to sell  surplus gas and  electricity.  After  the vote,  the  Tribune pro- 
claimed the city “the winner” (7 May 1905, 1,4). Constructing a detailed legis- 
lative history of this measure is difficult, but it is possible to identify at least 
some of the groups that favored and opposed the law. Among the major propo- 
nents of  the Enabling Act  was Chicago mayor Carter Harrison and perhaps 
some other Chicago politicians (Weber 1919, 8). The law also had broad-based 
support among Chicago consumers/voters. After the Enabling Act passed the 
state legislature, the city was required to ratify it in a local ballot. It passed by 
a  decisive  margin;  124,545 Chicagoans  voted  in  favor  of  the  law,  20,504 
against it (Chicago Tribune, 8 November  1905, 1). On the other hand, anec- 69  The Institutional Antecedents of State Utility Regulation 
dotal evidence from the popular press and gas industry journals indicates that 
Chicago gas companies vigorously opposed the Enabling Act.2S 
Although the Enabling Act passed the Illinois house and the senate unani- 
mously, it still appears that gas companies were reasonably effective lobbyists. 
During the first few months  that the Illinois legislature was drafting the En- 
abling Act, gas companies  had  an early version  of  the  law replaced by  the 
version that ultimately passed (Chicago Tribune, 7 May 1905, 1, 4). The con- 
stitutionality of this last version  was dubious. Even the legal counsel for the 
City of Chicago admitted that the constitutionality of the Enabling Act was in 
the “gravest doubt”  (Chicago Corporation Counsel  19  14). The Commercial 
and Financial Chronicle ( 13 May  1905, 19 16) also reported, “Friends of  the 
[Peoples Gas Light and Coke] company believe the [Enabling] law is not con- 
stitutional and can be successfully fought in the courts.” History would prove 
them right. The constitutional questions surrounding the Enabling Act are doc- 
umented below. This documentation will help explain the effectiveness of the 
law, as well as later political battles. 
After passage of the Enabling Act, the Chicago City Council did not imme- 
diately attempt to dictate gas rates in the city. Instead, in the spring of  1906, 
gas companies and the Chicago City Council managed to agree on one last 
contract ordinance. They contracted to fix  rates at $0.85 until  the  spring of 
191  1. In describing the ordinance of  1906, Weber (1919, 9) explained: “This 
ordinance was a contract ordinance, and was not designed to be coercive, nor 
assertive of any power derived from the law of  1905. The price of eighty-five 
cents was agreed to by  the Company [Peoples Gas] and was for the period of 
five years.” Perhaps the main reason the city council chose not to exercise its 
newfound regulatory powers was that it feared the ordinance would be chal- 
lenged in the courts. After passage of the Enabling Act, the Tribune speculated 
that the law would be challenged by producers if the city tried to regulate rates 
(7 May 1905, 1,4).  Municipal regulators may also have believed that by merely 
threatening to impose much lower rates on gas companies, they could intimi- 
date producers  into agreeing on a contract ordinance  voters would  find pal- 
atable. 
The 1906 contract ordinance was the last time gas companies and the city 
were able to agree on a rate schedule. In  the spring of  1911, when the  1906 
25. The Chicago Tribune reported that shortly after midnight, 6 May  1905-the  day that the 
Enabling Act was passed-Chicago  gas companies realized that they did not have enough support 
to block passage of the law. A Tribune reporter wrote: “Early this morning, shortly after midnight. 
representatives of the gas interests were hustling around Springfield [Illinois’s capital] trying to 
line [up] enough men to defeat Chicago’s bill [the Enabling Act]. Representatives were dragged 
out of bed. Others were found in  back rooms of  saloons, and others dragged away  from poker 
games. Cabs were jumping all over downtown streets and every inducement that could be brought 
to bear was used to get a stone wall erected in front of the measure” (7 May  1905,4).  Also, shortly 
after passage of  the Enabling Act. the American Gas Light Journal reported that the value of 
Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company stock fell because of the passage of unspecified legislation 
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ordinance was set to expire, the Chicago City Council asserted the regulatory 
powers granted to it by the Enabling Act of  1905. The city passed a coercive 
rate ordinance requiring Peoples Gas to reduce its rate to $0.70 by the end of 
1912. The company stonewalled. Rates remained at $0.85 until the summer of 
1911, when  a U.S. circuit court fixed the price of  gas in Chicago at $0.80 
pending further litigation. 
Only many years later, in Sutter v.  Peoples Gas Light and Coke Co., which 
was decided in  191  8, did the Illinois Supreme Court finally settle the dispute 
between the city and Peoples Gas. In Suttel; the court ruled that the Enabling 
Act of 1905 represented a “clear and palpable violation” of the Illinois consti- 
tutional provision  that no law embrace more than one subject.2h  Recall, the 
Enabling Act allowed the city to regulate rates and sell surplus gas and elec- 
tricity. The court’s use of the words “clear and palpable” suggests that the legal 
shortcomings of the Enabling Act were manifest. 
2.4.2  The Effects of Municipal Regulation 
If enforced by the courts, municipal regulation would have had a large effect 
on nominal gas prices in Chicago. First, if the city had been able to enforce 
the coercive rate ordinance of  1900, prices in Chicago would have fallen from 
$1  .OO to $0.75.*’ Such a 25 percent reduction in price would have had but one 
historical precedent. Except for  1883, there was no time in the history of  the 
Chicago gas industry that nominal prices fell by  such a large magnitude in a 
single year. (See table 2.1). Consider next the  1906 contract ordinance-the 
ordinance that followed the passage of the Enabling Act. Since this ordinance 
was a contract ordinance and required the consent of producers, it did not re- 
duce rates as much  as the coercive rate  ordinance of  1900. Nonetheless,  it 
appears that the increased threat of municipal rate regulation was enough to 
induce gas companies to agree to lower rates. The 1906 ordinance reduced gas 
prices by  15 percent between  1905 and  1906. Again, by  historical standards, 
this was a relatively  large reduction  in nominal  prices. Finally, the coercive 
rate ordinance passed by the city in 191  1 also would have had a large effect on 
nominal  prices  if  enforced, reducing  rates  from $0.85 to $0.70 within  two 
years. 
26. The court wrote, “The act [of 19051 was a clear and palpable violation of the constitutional 
provision that no act shall embrace more than one subject” (Sutter v. Peoples Gus Light und Coke 
Co., 284 Ill. 634 (1918), 646). See also Mills v.  Peoples Gas Light und Coke Co., 327 Ill. 508 
(1927). 
27. To  put this in  perspective. if  this ordinance had been enforced, the ratio of  gas prices in 
Chicago to the control-group prices discussed in note 22 and the associated text would have fallen 
below 0.500. The only other time gas prices in Chicago fell so low relative to prices in the control- 
group cities was during the mid-l880s, when one producer was driven into bankruptcy by price 
wars and others experienced financial difficulty. Again, though, because of the problems discussed 
in the section above on effects of Gas Acts, such comparisons should be interpreted cautiously. 71  The Institutional  Antecedents of State Utility Regulation 
2.5  The Political Economy of State Regulation 
2.5.1  A Legislative History of the Illinois Public Utilities Act 
The passage of the Enabling Act of 1905 did not resolve the political battle 
over municipal regulation. Since the dubious constitutionality of the law meant 
that the city still did not have a clear and unambiguous claim to regulate rates. 
there likely remained  pressure from both Chicago consumers and politicians 
for the city to  secure more regulatory  authority. Chicago gas companies, in 
contrast, wanted to prevent effective municipal regulation  and the low rates 
that would prevail under such a regime. There were two ways to deny the city 
ultimate regulatory control. Producers could challenge the constitutionality  of 
the Enabling Act in the courts, or they could secure passage of a law granting 
the state supreme regulatory control. Although the evidence presented below 
suggests that Chicago gas companies favored  the former, preferring  as little 
regulatory interference as possible, it appears that they were willing to tolerate 
state regulation if that was the only method of preventing effective municipal 
regulation. Thus, when the Illinois legislature began considering the creation 
of a state commission, Chicago consumers and politicians seized the opportu- 
nity to express their demands for municipal control. Producers countered by 
lobbying against any measures that expanded the city’s authority. In the end, 
neither group secured their most preferred regulatory structure, though produc- 
ers managed to forestall the relatively hostile regulation of municipal author- 
ities. 
Before it created a state commission to regulate utilities, the Illinois legisla- 
ture organized the Illinois Legislative Public Utilities Commission. The com- 
mission solicited volumes of testimony from Illinois utilities, consumers, mu- 
nicipal leaders, regulators from other states, and academics in order to assess 
the political demand for state regulation. According to the commission’s report 
and all other secondary and state government sources surveyed in this paper, 
consumers and politicians  in Chicago opposed state regulation  of  utilities. 
They favored, instead, vesting the city council with regulatory 
Among  utilities,  support for a state commission  was mixed. The general 
counsel to Commonwealth Edison (electric) was “non-committal, but inclined 
to favor some system of [state] commission regulation.” Apparently convinced 
that the Enabling  Act  would eventually be declared unconstitutional  by the 
courts, the general counsel for the Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company “op- 
posed . . . state regulation.” He favored a system of limited local control “with 
jnal recourse to the courts” (emphasis added).29  The president of  the Chicago 
28. For example, “[tlhe general sentiment in Chicago was opposed to state regulation; the opin- 
ion expressed. . .  being that control should be vested in the local authorities” (Kneier 1927, 158). 
See also Illinois General Assembly 1913, 857-59;  1917. 
29. This quote, and all of  the quotations and preferences summarized above, are from Illinois 
General Assembly 1913, 857. 72  Werner Troesken 
City Railway Company favored a system where local authorities had limited 
control, but was willing to consider a state regulatory regime if it was similar 
to Wisconsin’s (see Illinois General Assembly  1913, 857; Wendt and Kogan 
1967, 172-73).  Finally, other sources indicate that Samuel Insull, chairman of 
both the Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company (after July  1913) and Com- 
monwealth  Edison,  had  been  advocating  state  regulation  for  several  years 
(MacDonald 1958). 
From this set of conflicting interests, the Illinois Public Utilities Act (IPUA) 
emerged. The act was initially introduced as House Bill 907 (HB 907). In its 
original form, HB 907 provided that the governor would appoint a five-person 
commission to supervise Illinois utilities. The commission would have control 
over corporate franchises, the capitalization of utility companies, and the rates 
charged by utilities. After HB 907 passed the house, the senate amended the 
measure, adding a provision widely supported among Chicago politicians and 
consumers. This provision granted Chicago what was termed home rule. Home 
rule would have given the Chicago City Council exclusive regulatory control 
over utilities operating in the city, preventing any interference from state regu- 
lators. The home-rule provision, if enacted, would have meant that, even if the 
Enabling  Act  was  declared  unconstitutional  by  the  courts,  the  city  council 
could have regulated gas rates. The senate also struck out the provisions giving 
the commission regulatory powers over the capitalization of public utility com- 
panies.  In  the  end, though,  the  house  refused  to concur  with  any  of  these 
amendments, and the bill was passed in its original form.’” 
Among the primary opponents of the senate’s amendment to grant Chicago 
home  rule  (the  authority  to  regulate  rates)  were  Chicago  gas companies; 
among  its  major  supporters  were  Chicago  politicians  and  consumers.  The 
Springfield Illinois State Register (23 June  1913, 4) reported, “[I)  was quite 
significant during the fight [over the IPUA] that the corporation lobby vigor- 
ously opposed the ‘home rule’ [municipal regulation] feature, and was elated 
when that principal was finally eliminated.” When the IPUA was passed with- 
out the senate’s home-rule provision, Chicago alderman Charles Merriam pro- 
claimed the law “the crowning triumph of corporation politics in Illinois” (Chi- 
cago Tribune, 24 June  1913, 2). Many  of  Merriam’s colleagues  on the city 
council  echoed  his  sentiments. According  to  the  Tribune, “[tlhree  hundred 
[Chicago]  residents  gathered  . . . and  adopted  resolutions  calling  on  Gov. 
Dunne to veto the act and save Chicago’s home rule privileges” (27 June 19  13, 
I). Several other groups and businesses organized to ask that the governor veto 
the IPUA.”  These pleas failed to dissuade the governor. The bill was signed 
into law on 30 June, 19  13 and became operative on  1 January  19  14. 
30. This summary of  the IPUA’s  legislative history is taken from Chicago Tribune, 21  June 
1913, 1-2. 
31. See Chicago Tribune, 24 June 1913, 1-2;  26 June 1913, 2; 27 June 1913, 1; 28 June 1913. 
1-2;  1 July 1913, 1, 7; 2 July 1913, I.  The Quincy Daily Herald reported that the Chicago groups 
opposed the IPUA because it lacked the home-rule measure included the Association of  Com- 73  The Institutional Antecedents of  State Utility Regulation 
2.5.2  The Effects of State Regulation 
While it is not possible to construct precise estimates of the effects of state 
regulation on prices, several independent pieces of qualitative and quantitative 
evidence  suggest  that  municipal  regulation,  if  enforced,  would  have  led  to 
lower rates than state regulation. First, qualitative evidence on the regulatory 
preferences  of  consumers  and  producers  is consistent  with this  hypothesis. 
Across states and industries, utilities lobbied for state regulation because they 
saw it as one way  to forestall the relatively  hostile regulation  of  municipal 
authorities.32  For example, between  1905 and  1913, at various  gas industry 
association meetings, industry and state government representatives from Cali- 
fornia and Wisconsin argued that state regulation was needed because munici- 
pal regulation was too harsh or political (see American Gas Light Journal, 28 
September 1908,537;  25 March  1912,207; 14 April 1913,242; 29 May 191 1, 
1043-44).  Other authors document the identical sentiments for water and elec- 
tric utilities (see Jacobson  1989; Blackford  1970; MacDonald  1957,  1 17-1  9; 
Thelen  1972, 286-87).  It  appears  that consumers  shared producers’  beliefs 
that rates were lower under municipal regulation than state regulation. For ex- 
ample,  in  Minnesota  an  organization  known  as the  Minnesota  Home-Rule 
League published pamphlets protesting a bill that would have created a state 
utilities  commission. (The bill was not passed.) Presenting evidence on the 
performance of state regulation in Wisconsin, the group claimed that state reg- 
ulators were captured by  utilities while municipal regulators were responsive 
to the preferences of consumers (Minnesota Home-Rule League  1914). 
At least three systematic empirical studies of state utility regulation are con- 
sistent with  this  qualitative evidence. Moore  and  Stigler and Friedland,  for 
example, show that state regulation by commission typically had a negligible 
effect on prices (see Stigler and Friedland 1962; Moore 1970; to a lesser ex- 
tent, Meyer and Leland  1980). More to the point, Jarrell  (1978) argues that 
state regulatory commissions were not created in response to consumers’ de- 
mands for lower rates, but rather in response to utilities who hoped that state 
regulation would insulate them against the relatively hostile policies of munici- 
pal regulators. If the purpose of state regulation was to lower rates, one would 
expect states with relatively high rates to be the first to create state commis- 
sions.  Jarrell  finds  the  opposite.  He divides  states  into  two  groups,  early- 
regulated states and later-regulated states. Early-regulated states created utility 
merce, the Iroquois Club, the Hamilton Club, the United  Societies Club, the City Club. the Citi- 
zen’s  Association, the  Municipal  Voter’s  League, and the  Legislative  Voters’  League (25 June 
1913, 1). 
32. Since utilities were regulated  by  several local governments when they operated across mu- 
nicipal jurisdictions, they may  have also favored state regulalion  because they would have had to 
deal  with fewer regulators. Sylla ( 1992) makes the analogous argument for federal regulation. 
maintaining that regulation by multiple states was one reason big business preferred federal regula- 
tion to state regulation. 74  Werner Troesken 
commissions between  1912 and 1917. Later-regulated states created commis- 
sions after 1917. After adjusting for cross-state variations in demand and cost 
conditions, Jarrell finds that electric utilities in early-regulated  states charged 
lower prices and earned lower profits than electric companies in later-regulated 
states. In  short, Jarrell’s results suggest that  low profits  and rates, not  high, 
drove legislatures to create state commissions. 
Finally, gas prices in Chicago under state and municipal regulation are com- 
pared with prices in  a control group of  cities. The same technique was used 
earlier to identify the effects of the Gas Acts. Also, the same cities that were 
used  as a control group in that  analysis are used  here to assess the relative 
effectiveness  of  state and  municipal  regulation.  Since these  control-group 
cities had regulatory regimes that remained constant for the entire period be- 
tween  1878 and  1924 and Chicago moved from municipal rate regulation to 
state regulation  in  1914, dividing the Chicago gas price by  the average price 
across  the  control-group  cities  yields  a  ratio  that,  over  time, controls for 
industry-wide changes in prices. Assuming that the  1900, 1905, and 19  1 1 rate 
ordinances had been enforced, the average value of the ratio of Chicago prices 
to the control-group price under these ordinances would have been 58 percent. 
During the period of state regulation, from 1914 through  1924, the ratio aver- 
aged 68 percent.33  This is consistent with the hypothesis that municipal regula- 
tion  reduced  rates  more than  did  state regulation.  However,  because  of  the 
endogeneity issue, the possibility of idiosyncratic city effects, and other poten- 
tial problems discussed above, these data need to be interpreted cautiously. 
2.5.3  Explaining the Relative Effectiveness of  State and Municipal 
Regulation 
One way to explain why state regulators were more sympathetic to produc- 
ers’ interests than were municipal regulators is with a simple principal-agent 
framework, an approach now frequently used in economic models of politics. 
A standard assumption in these models is that the legislator acts as an agent 
for the median voter (see, for example, Kalt and Zupan 1984; Peltzman 1985). 
The approach here qualifies this assumption only slightly. Besides assuming 
that state and local lawmakers acted as agents of the median voter, it also as- 
sumes that the median voter was a gas consumer. 
In the context of this framework, there are three reasons to expect that the 
median voter would have monitored municipal regulators better than state reg- 
ulators. First, under municipal regulation the city council regulated  gas rates 
directly, while under state regulation rates were determined by a commission. 
Since commissions were subject to only limited review by the state legislature, 
regulation by commission introduced an additional layer of agency costs; vot- 
ers monitored  the legislators, who then monitored  the reg~lators.’~  Second, 
33. The control-group cities discussed earlier are used again for the following comparisons. See 
discussion above for qualification\ and problems with such comparisons. 
34. To the degree that legislatures anticipated administrative shirking and devised procedural 
rules to minimize it, this problem would have been limited. See McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 75  The Institutional Antecedents of State Utility Regulation 
local legislators represented small, geographically concentrated constituencies 
in comparison to state regulators. As a result, in the context of municipal regu- 
lation, the free-rider problems that typically confound voters’ efforts to moni- 
tor their political representatives would have been less severe (see Olson 197  1). 
One final reason to expect municipal regulation to have been more respon- 
sive to voters than state regulation is that municipal leaders dealt with a smaller 
number of issues than state legislators, and utility rates were among the most 
important of  these. Utility  regulation  was, in other words, a salient issue in 
local politics; in late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Chicago, gas and 
electric rates were front-page news. As a consequence, there were strong elec- 
toral incentives for local politicians to promise and deliver low utility rates to 
voters. For example, during the municipal election campaign of 19  1  1, an alder- 
man organized the Seventy Cent Gas League. According to a government re- 
port, the group made seventy-cent gas a campaign slogan and solicited candi- 
dates’ promises to pass a seventy-cent ordinance (Illinois General Assembly 
1913, 858). Another contemporary observer argued that Carter Harrison was 
elected mayor on his promise to bring the city seventy-cent gas (Weber 1919, 
9). Shortly after the election, the city passed the aforementioned 191  1 coercive 
rate ordinance, ordering Peoples Gas to reduce its rates to $0.70 in  1912. 
Contemporary observers of utility regulation shared the view that municipal 
regulation, because it was closer to the voters, was more responsive to consum- 
ers and less responsive to producers. Alderman Charles Merriam argued, “The 
real reason why many corporations prefer state to local control is not that one 
is more  ‘political’  than  the  other, but that the indirect  pressure of the  state 
electorate is preferred to the direct pressure of the local electorate”  (Illinois 
General Assembly  1917, 27). The president of the Pacific Gas Association, 
and an Oakland gas company, articulated the identical position.” 
Older historical accounts of local politics often accuse municipal regulators 
of extorting bribes from utilities by  threatening to impose competition or un- 
reasonably low rate ordinances on them (see, for example, Roberts  1960). In 
Chicago, for example, the popular press reported that the ordinances granting 
the Universal and Ogden gas companies operating rights in the city were bla- 
tant attempts to extort money from the Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company. 
According to the Tribune, after these ordinances were passed, they were to be 
sold to the highest bidder. This, incidentally, did not happen. Both the Univer- 
sal and Ogden companies actually operated and were competitors with Peoples 
Gas for several years before they were purchased.’h 
Such accounts are consistent with the simple principal-agent framework out- 
1989. Shepsle (1992) provides some reasons why it might be difficult to forestall all administrative 
shirking, or what he and others call bureaucratic drift. 
35. See his 1908 speech before the Pacific Gas Association, reprinted in American Gas Lighr 
Journal, 28 September 1908, 537. 
36. See Chicago Tribune, 18 July 1894, 1-2;  4 March 1895, 1-2.  See also Roberts 1960; Wendt 
and Kogan 1967, 11  8-20. 76  Werner Troesken 
lined here. If  voters monitored  municipal legislators better than state legisla- 
tors, it would have cost municipal legislators more votes than state legislators 
to permit high rates. Municipal regulators, in other words, would have been 
more reluctant than state regulators to permit high rates. Thus, if both state and 
local regulators were in the business of extorting bribes from utilities, utilities 
would, on average, have had to bribe state regulators less for higher rates be- 
cause higher rates cost state legislators fewer votes than they cost municipal 
regulators.  Alternatively,  one  could  say  that,  because  municipal  regulators 
could win more votes by  lowering utility rates, they were in a better position 
to credibly  threaten  to  impose competition  or unreasonably  low  rate  ordi- 
nances  on  utilities  if  utilities  did  not  pay  them  off.  As  Wendt  and Kogan 
note in their biography of John Coughlin and Mike Kenna, two of Chicago’s 
most corrupt and colorful aldermen during this era, “It has always been . . . 
strange , . . that a [state] legislator can be bought cheaper than an alderman” 
(1967, 172). 
Lastly, note the role asset specificity may have played in all of this. If produc- 
ers had  not been  held  hostage to specific geographic regions by  their fixed 
distribution systems, competition among municipalities for manufactured gas 
would have constrained the efforts of municipal authorities to set onerous rate 
schedules. This, in turn, would have limited producers’ incentives to lobby for 
state regulation. 
2.6  Summary 
The following argument has been advanced to explain the emergence of  a 
state commission to regulate  Chicago gas companies. For most of  the nine- 
teenth century, the market mechanism and Illinois law limited the demand for 
political  rate regulation among both Chicago gas producers  and consumers. 
During this period, market forces encouraged producers to charge reasonably 
competitive rates, and thus limited the benefits of rate regulation to consumers. 
At the same time, the Illinois Constitution protected the investments  of  Chi- 
cago gas companies by  preventing the city from regulating rates. This period 
of unregulated competition was brought to an end in 1897 with the passage of 
the Gas Acts. These laws granted producers substantial market power and ap- 
pear to have driven up gas prices. These changes in price and market structure 
increased the demand among consumers for municipal regulation. Consumers 
favored  municipal  regulation  over state regulation  because  they believed  it 
brought them lower prices. Utilities favored state regulation for the same rea- 
son. Consumers typically expressed their preferences for municipal regulation 
in one of two ways: through the vote or by expressing their demands at meet- 
ings of existing civic and business organizations like the Civic Federation of 
Chicago. To the degree that city and state lawmakers had an incentive to re- 
spond to the political agitation among unorganized voters and consumers, the 
State of Illinois began reducing the constitutional constraints on the regulatory 
powers  of municipal authorities, while the Chicago  City  Council  began  in- 77  The Institutional Antecedents of State Utility Regulation 
creasing  its efforts to regulate gas rates.  In turn, gas companies  lobbied  to 
prevent municipal authorities from expanding their regulatory powers. From 
the ensuing political battle, state regulation emerged. Producers,  though fa- 
voring  an environment with  the fewest possible  regulatory  constraints,  saw 
state regulation as one way to forestall the relatively hostile regulation of mu- 
nicipal authorities. 
This interpretation highlights many of the salient aspects of the early history 
of utility regulation. First, it helps explain why producers favored state regula- 
tion over municipal regulation: since free-rider problems were less severe in 
small groups, consumers were better able to monitor municipal regulators than 
state regulators. This insight not only buttresses previous empirical work (for 
example, Jarrell 1978) but also clarifies the role consumer agitation and munic- 
ipal politics  played in giving rise to state utility regulation. Beyond this, the 
paper has presented limited evidence on  how  well the Chicago gas industry 
functioned under alternative regulatory regimes, including those that preceded 
state regulation. By focusing more closely on these early regulatory arrange- 
ments, future research might reveal some additional evidence on the origins of 
regulation by state commission. Finally, Chicago’s experience helps document 
the role asset specificity played in the battle for utility regulation. 
More generally, Chicago’s experience contributes to a growing body of em- 
pirical and theoretical writings on the nature of institutional change and the 
growth of government. For example, the Chicago gas industry evolved gradu- 
ally toward state-regulated monopoly, first adopting laws sanctioning monop- 
oly and then expanding the regulatory powers of  local and state authorities. 
This illustrates North’s (1990, 4-7)  recent argument that institutional change 
tends to be an incremental process as opposed to a set of radical and discrete 
changes. Finally, several recent studies document the interplay between politi- 
cal and technological change, showing, for example, the relationship between 
the introduction of refrigeration and the origins of federal antitrust and meat- 
inspection  laws.37  Chicago’s history  offers  another variation on this  theme, 
identifying potential links between the introduction of water gas and the pas- 
sage of laws inhibiting entry into the gas industry. 
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